Introduction As some of you will know, although I am an atheist I don't think that theism is necessarily irrational. I also think that religion is misunderstood in 'militant' atheist circles. (I used 'militant' for want of a better word - you guys know what I mean...) The common view is that fundamentalism is real religion and that moderatism is simply those who can't bring themselves to fully accept or reject fundamentalist religion so cherry pick as what suits them. I think that this is a narrow view that misunderstands religion. So now I've made a claim on what religion isn't, I need to now offer a positive account of what religion is and then provide evidence that my account accurately responds to the real life practices of religious people. While this might or might not reflect the majority of religious people, it certainly reflects the practices of religion that has grown with modern times. It would atleast give us an idea of how a "not irrational" religion would be, one that we could set as an ideal. It would give a more accurate standard as to what is 'rational', so the accusations are directed purely where appropiate. Without further ado, here's the argument: Preliminaries Before we go on, I just want to make some clarifications on what it is for a belief to be irrational. A belief irrational if there is some flaw in the reasoning. Perhaps a subtle fallacy in conclusions drawn or maybe false premise behind it. This doesn't mean that the person is irrational in believing it - the RRS accept that the theist themselves might be being rational, i.e. reasoning with the best knowledge they have at that time, but the belief itself isn't rational as their reason would reject it if they knew better. Another point I think needs acknowledging is the 'context' of calling a belief irrational - why we see it as a bad thing. If you think about the part that beliefs play in our lives, how we will sit down because we believe a chair is below us - an incorrect belief would lead to us falling. We need beliefs to be accurate for them to have practical purpose in our lives. Reason is our way of making beliefs as accurate as possible, so to have a belief that is irrational is of little use to us and will affect our decision making for the worse. So because we need a 'belief' to be accurate and reason is the best way to ensure this accuracy, we want our beliefs to be as rational as possible. In a similar way, an action is rational if it reason declares it the best way to achieve the aim that it was supposed to. The last point I want to make is one about language. Language is a very diverse thing and this can lead to all sorts of philosophical confusions. I'm sure you're all familiar with the fallacy of equivocation - it's when we confuse that the same word can mean two different things. e.g. A bank is a good place to put money and a bank is on the edge of a river so I should throw my money into the river. That one was pretty obvious - it's the more subtle ones that cause the real confusion. Wittgenstein liked to use the word 'game' as an example. He claimed that the various uses of the word game were related in various ways but were also subtly different. He claimed that whatever 'essence' of 'definition' you tried to tie down to the word 'game' you could find a game out there that was counter example. In a similar way, I think that our real world usage of the word 'belief' doesn't quite reduce to the way we were using it above. Although belief as something that needs to be accurate for practical purposes is a common way we use 'belief', it is not the only way we use that word. I think that 'religious belief' is subtly different to 'practical belief'. Not completely different - they will be closely related and the differences will be subtle. However, the differences will be enough to make a difference on how they ought to be evaluated and thereby leave them different on how they should be judged to be 'rational' or not. With that, I am ready to finally put forward my hypothesis on what religious belief is. The Hypothesis - Religious belief is subtly different to practical belief and these differences warrant a difference in evaluation. If I am saying that religious belief is to be evaluated differently to practical belief then I need to claim that they have different purposes. Practical belief has the obvious practical usage - if we want to eat an Orange then we need to know where to find an orange and that our beliefs on where to find an orange will determine our success or failure in this. My claim is that religious belief has a different purpose. Rather than instant practical use, the value of religious belief is the way it affects our outlook on the world. That is, the psychological effect that these 'articles of faith' have on our life in general. So for a religious belief to be valuable/commendable it would have to: a) Have a positive effect on our life - particularly in our morality and personal meaning and happiness. b) NOT interfere with our practical rationality - i.e. not contradict our scientific knowledge. Bear in mind that other than this difference in justification/application, this belief would be pretty much the same. It would be psychologically similar, 'feel' similar, so if you'd ask someone if <insert religious claim> really happened then they'd say yes. The only difference would be that they wouldn't "feel right" about applying religious doctrine practically in the same way we do with other beliefs and justify these beliefs by the effect that it has on their life. My belief that this is the natural state of religion and that literalists on both sides have misunderstood it, both by assuming that religious belief and practical belief are the same thing. One dismisses religious belief for not holding to the standards of practical belief, the other bastardizes their practical belief in an attempt to unify both together. (While I both think they've misunderstood religion to the same degree, I think that the dismissal of religion is much less severe than trying to unify them.) Having said that, while I think that there is argument for moderate religion being natural religion and fundamentalism being the perversion, I'll leave that for another topic as I think there's enough to debate here as it is. For now I'll just settle for the fact that religion/theism can be 'not irrational'. Notice that I've said 'not irrational' rather than 'rational'. If religious practice is a different practice to normal belief to be valued in a different way then it's quite likely that the evaluation would be different too. Rather than rational or irrational, I think that religion is a-rational and would be valued as more 'good/bad' or 'humanitarian/inhuman' rather than 'correct/incorrect' or 'rational/irrational'. The consequence of this hypothesis would be that there's such thing as 'religious belief' where: a) The 'beliefs' are like normal belief except do not have direct practical application. (Any good religion should have clauses like "Thou shalt not put the lord to the test" or "The lord works in mysterious ways" or "God is ultimately beyond man's expectations/understanding") b) The religious belief is to be justified by the positive effect on the person and people. ("Before I accepted Jesus into my life... blah blah blah..." - well, you might not find this convincing but atleast they're arguing for the right thing! ) c) Although they often take care to make sure that there is no direct contradiction between their religious beliefs and practical ones, they don't feel the need to scientifically justify their religious beliefs. (Hence the employment of 'faith' and the 'God of Gaps') My argument is simply that moderate religion be judged by it's effect on the person. There could easily be a counter argument in the form of "But religion is bad for the person psychologically/spiritually/socially too because..." which is fair enough - the only conclusion I am trying to settle here is that moderate religion is to be judged by its effect on the person rather than how well it matches scientific fact. I consider it still possible that even moderate religion might fall flat in the face of this kind of judgement too, but I'd be surprised. Evidence that moderate religion really is like this and that I'm not merely projecting how I'd like it to be. So how would I go about providing evidence that religion is 'this way' rather than 'that way'? I've made two claims about moderates regarding their religious belief, that they don't treat it like practical knowledge and that they justify it by the effect that it has on their lives. I can justify this by picking out typical behaviours and phrases that we expect from them and show that they fit my theory. Evidence that moderates don't treat articles of faith like practical knowledge First see if you can even get out of them a belief that has practical application. I mean, they do base practices on their religion but not with direct consequences. The religious practice is justified as a whole for other reasons. In the meantime, individual beliefs do not have individual applications. My belief in gravity means that I would happily bet my entire life savings that if I was to hold a plastic ball (you're not going to hustle me with magnets here! ) in the air and let go then it would drop to the ground. Do the moderates have any religious beliefs that they could base bets on in the same way? A lot of Catholics believe that the bread and wine is transformed into the body and blood of Christ - see what response you get if you ask them what affect eating human flesh and blood has on their diet, and if they happen to be vegetarian then do they pass by the Eucharist? If you were to ever make the claim "If Christianity was true then God would X and Y - after all, that's the character of the God described!" then they are likely to say that "Religion doesn't work like that", or "You're missing the point" or "The lord works in mysterious ways" or "It's not your place to understand God's plan, just trust." Are these actions and phrases common to the moderates you're familiar with? Do you disagree that they are characteristics of moderates or do you disagree that they fit my theory? Evidence that moderates justify their beliefs on their effect rather than their scientific accuracy/certainty It's often been said that the rationality that they apply to the other areas of their life seem to bypass the moderate's treatment of religion. What's more, they vigourously argue that it's just not appropiate, often trying to point out other areas in our life where we don't feel the need to be scientific. They are fond of the 'God of Gaps' (both unsupported and uncontradicted by science) Even where contradictions appear between their scientific and religious beliefs, they try to brush them aside as if they didn't matter. They clearly see their religiousness as a-scientific, living out the NOMA split as described by Gould. So what happens when you ask them why they believe? They will talk about morality and meaning. They will talk about what religion does for them on a daily basis - they clearly draw strength from it. They often have anecdotes and stories about themselves or friends or even people they've read about. The stories will often involve a rebellious character who didn't think much to religion, had some problems, accepted religion and that solved them. They often consider their religion to be an integral part of their moral practice too. Whether religion really is a help in these things is up for debate - my point is that it's these things that justify or discredit religion. Another evidence is how they judge differing beliefs. Moderates tend to be happy that other faiths can lead to God while others who claim to be of the same faith are 'false'. How do they judge who is close to God and who it not? Once again it's the character of the believers. Those religious sects that do bad (e.g. the inquisition, the terrorists, extortionists) etc are those who have lost their way. (The cheeky bastards even call them atheists!!) Those of other religions who do good (e.g. peaceful Buddhists) are often seen as being close to God in the eyes of the moderate. Again, you will have to decide yourselves whether my charitarizing of the moderate fits with your own experience. I think it's characteristics we're all familiar with, it's just that I'm offering a new interpretation to the data, one that wasn't considered before and one that I personally think fits better. These examples were the best I could come up with from the top of my head. The verification/falsification will be a more gradual process. Now the theory is in your mind, it will subconsciously test it everytime you meet a moderate. Over time you will gradually get the feeling that the theory fits moderate behaviour or you will find yourself feeling that it doesn't. (That'll be your subconscious brain functions giving the results of their analysing your experiences) I'd like to think that means you'll start to agree with me within the year but it's perhaps more likely you'll finally start presenting all those counter examples that your brain has been picking up!! I guess time will tell! What does this mean for fundamentalism. There's always been this misconception towards fundamentalists, that they are the ones who follow the Bible properly rather than cherry pick. Truth is, they cherry pick just as much as moderates do, if not more so. Or where they don't they're willing to completely contradict themselves. You see, religious belief can often mean what you want it to mean at that moment in time. The religious believer's interpretation of their Holy Book will depend on the Zeitegeist of their time and place. Fundamentalists do this to a higher degree than anyone. God is the most loving, caring and understanding when they're trying sell him to people and then turns into a wrathful monster who dishes out eternal damnation when they want to scare you into obedience. They know the absolute truth about things when they're feeling assertive and want to tell you that X is sinful and that Y actually happened but will declare God beyond all understanding when pressed to give a rational justification for their beliefs. In the same way, they will play the "This is the hard truth - not what you want God to be..." when arguing with moderates and then pull out the "You rationalists want to take all the mystery of life and turn love and feeling into some mathematical equation" when the sceptics start challenging them on the facts. They are happy to flip from one to another depending on who they are debating. I don't think that many people change their mind on a major issue from a single argument. A single argument might be the final straw the triggers the change in mind but more often than not it takes a several points to be on the back of the mind before the person is open to change. After all, if our idea only has a couple of slight problems we see them as something we can work around, that answers will come to. Some changes will come around through attacking the purely unscientifficness of religious belief, but I don't think that it will get very far on its own. After all, when you consider the reasons why people have faith, scientific fact is irrelevent. Apologetics has never converted anyone, merely helped people who were attracted to the lifestyle of religion and were hoping for a way to find a loophole in their scientific knowledge. (Is it a coincidence that Strobel found the Christian arguments more convincing after he admired the personality changes in his wife?) If we want to attack fundamentalism then we want to attack it from all sides at once. "My beliefs are on faith, on hope and love" is presented as an excuse to dismiss sceptical criticism, perhaps just the day after they used "You can't just believe what you want" to dismiss the humanitarian appeals of moderates. That's why I see moderates as an ally against fundamentalism rather than a cover for it. Fundies can only use moderates as cover where the sceptic's remarks affect moderates. If we were to work with moderates to bring forward the ideal anti-fundy arguments, ones that targeted objective claims while accepting the validity of personal faith, fundamentalism would have no cover at all. Not that we wouldn't have disagreement and debate with moderates too, just that would be a leisurely topic to debate for fun, rather than one that our politics and future critically hangs on. Anysway, here's my theory of moderate religion. Thoughts?
I think you have made a mistake in trying to define a religious belief entirely in relation to a specific function. Ironically, I think Ayer made the same mistake when he tried to define empirical statements in terms of a predictive function, thus dismissing religion. The problem is that the religious values are not themselves a part of the outlook entailed by a religious statement. They are derived from certain positive facts that are included in religious statements. "Allah is almighty" is not just a way of expressing and understanding a particular world view that includes not eating pork. They do not eat pork, because Allah is almighty. If they knew with complete certainty that there was not an all powerful god, they would be forced to abandon their decision not to eat meat. I do not disagree that this sort of analysis can be valuable in certain situations, or even that it is correct is the case of certain people's religious beliefs, but I do not believe that your analysis of moderate religion is correct.
The example you use here is what would come under my definition of fundamentalism. I don't think modernised Muslims would justify their Halal diet in the way you just gave. Even if a moderate Muslim did give such a justification for their diet, that would still be an example of fundamentalist thinking, even if their beliefs were usually 'liberal'. My position allows for the posibility that religious people will hold fundamentalist beliefs, that their thinking won't be perfect. (After all, humans are humans and we all have our little irrationalities and superstitions, some of us more than others.) Here's what I wrote in that other topic regarding fundamentalists: Yes you're right that some, if not many, religious people justify their beliefs in the way you describe. However, my position allows for that and sweeping statements like "All religion is irrational" require your examples to exhaust all religion. You won't manage to achieve that with counter examples.
I don't like your use of the word fundamentalism. You seem to call any literal belief in a god fundamentalism and people that hold metaphorical beliefs moderates. This does is not what I understand the words to mean. Perhaps most people we would refer to as 'moderates' would be prepared to reject a literal interpretation of the Bible, but I doubt that most 'moderates' would reject the idea of a literal god altogether.
Moderates and fundamentalists: Moderate religion is simply taking the parts of religion that conform to the social and moral zeitgeist of the time. You do this your called a moderate. Fundamentalist religion is simply taking the religion, in its original form, as applying it into an different era. You do that and your called a fundamentalist. Tell me what is wrong with these definitions? They are clear and concise and they explain what we observe. When people declare that fundamentalism is a distortion of 'real' religion, all it does is reveal that they are incapable of putting the religion into historical and social context; they're stuck on their perch in their social/moral zeitgeist and can only analyze it from that perspective, thus, 'real' religion is merely what they think is moral, as per their societies moral zeitgeist. As I've said before: there is no such thing as 'real' religion. Religion is simply the individual projecting their beliefs, their desires, their ideologies and their prejudices into a god in order to gain a divine mandate for what they want, and obviously what they want will be dictated by their society, which explains why scripture is full of things we would consider fundamentalist in any modern society: because when a religion is created it inherits the morals and standards of the society within which it is created, via the individuals that created it. A better explanation would be that they are merely behaving in a way which is appropriate to the society that their belief originated in, where, for instance, killing heretics and sinners was not only appropriate, but often required. Look back at how I'm defining fundamentalists: transporting a religion from era into another where it becomes fundamentalist. There behaviour is in line with medieval times. Religion and science: Yeah, and how do they justify this meaning and morality? By taking a recourse to god. They will often say that without god, the morality and meaning is nonexistent. How do they justify god? On what basis do they believe in god? By making evidenced-based arguments: "the Bible proves it"; "design proves it", etc. So when you actually move beyond the superficial exterior of their beliefs and claims, their position is rooted in evidence-based claims. In my view, you cannot hold beliefs, particularly religious beliefs, without--at some point--confronting reality and evidence, which is why I think the scientific method, or at least scientific skepticism, is the best process to evaluate what your being told. I disagree. Many theists will specifically rely on the truth of the events in the Bible as the basis for the truth in spirituality or morality that they pull from it. CKava explained this with his angles example. Without the perceived factual basis behind the belief, they will likely not believe. I don't think personal experience should be how you determine what religion is like. You should look at the wider issue, look at the various cultures and practices. You can't just meet nice theists and conclude that this is what 'real' religion is like.
I think the problem is how you are defining fundamentalism: simply holding a factual/literal belief. This would essentially place every theist in that camp since theism is by definition belief in god and that he has your interests in mind. I don't even know you can attempt to argue for a metaphorical god within theism given its definition. At best you may be able to argue that--somehow--a deist can be metaphorical in their belief (although I don't see how), but certainly not theism. I don't reject the idea that some theists will be purely metaphorical for things like the virgin births, resurrections, and miracles, but I think you seriously overestimate the number of theists who reject all factual religious claims. The number will be tiny. I think this problem is the result of you trying, for some bizzare reason, to define religion in an a-rational manner. I think the task is hopeless, demonstrated by the lengths you have gone to achieve it. With your definition of fundamentalism, you're essentially calling every theist a fundamentalist! I don't think your going to successfully argue that no moderate holds factual/literal beliefs.
On a more humorous note... atheists are not really all that different from theists... get anymore than one in a room (or a thread) and they'll endlessly disagree amongst themselves. As this thread has amply illustrated so far.
I can agree that atheists tend to disagree but I think drawing a parallel between atheism and theism because of this is a bit of a tenuous conclusion. All humans disagree if you look at a fishing forum you will undoubtedly find strong debate but does that mean fishermen are like theists? I don't think so. Though I suppose you could be forgiven for associating disagreement over minor details with religion! As for this thread I think Strafio is at the very accomodating end of atheism whereas Topher is at the opposite end. LJoll is somewhere in the middle but more towards Topher and I probably agree more with Topher but appreciate Strafio's motivation. And slip as far as I know you are also an atheist but I think your off on your own with a sniper rifle aiming at any theist or atheist who holds a strong agenda- I don't agree with your criticism this time but I appreciate even handedness . Point is though I think debate even within a group with a shared outlook is always beneficial. I'd also like to hear what some moderate religious individuals think of Strafio's post but they may all be scared away!
I've got a reply but it's not letting me post... Is there a limit to the size that MAP can handle? Anyway, I'll try splitting it into two halves: Lol! I think I'd have to convince the religious folks that I wasn't reducing their beliefs to metaphor as well!! Topher, it's good to see you back. How'd the exams go? LJoll, I didn't quote your post because Topher made the same point. This reply is for you too! Nothing wrong with this definition. However, language is a fluid thing and most words are rarely set in stone. Fundamentalism has come to mean a number of things and I think that my definition also captures a genuine use of it. That's one possibility, and it's not a theory I've ruled out altogether. However, I think I've found a better one. I agree that no particular theology or set of beliefs captures 'real religion'. However, I think that as a human practice, we can recognise what religion is and what has made it useful to man and made people value it and call that 'real religion'. After all, that's how the idea of 'real science' develloped that gradually came to ditch the practices of astrology and alchemy which were once indistinguishable practices to the 'real sciences'. Your theory is coherent but it's not without problems. These people I'd consider to be fundamentalists. You're doing the same thing that LJoll did earlier. When I say personal experience, I mean personal observations of religious people and of religious practice. I agree that we should take a look at the bigger picture through history and culture. As it happens, my views have been influenced and encouraged by the work of anthropologist Joseph Cambell's book, The Hero with a Thousand Faces Rook Hawkins, although he argues against people claiming that the Gospels were fact, he also argues against them being called lies or fiction. He points out that fictions served a different purpose in that culture. Religion was something in of itself. (I'm basing this on his posts in this thread. I think I understood him correctly - feel free to read it for yourself and form your own opinion.)
You both (LJoll too) seem to have a problem with my definition of 'fundamentalist'. Maybe you prefer to use the word in a different way. I think I've captured a common usage, and even if not could we just accept it for this topic so we can talk the same language. You can choose which definition we use in your topic. If you really want I can invent a new word to describe what I mean, but does it really have to come to that? I'm not arguing against this. If you read the topic more carefully, I've pointed out that the word 'belief' can pick out a variety of concepts, each closely related but with subtle differences. I've said that religious belief and scientific belief are the same in every single way except how the believer makes practical use of that belief. That's the only difference I'm pointing out. From there, I point out that this difference allows in a different form of justification in each belief. We use scientific beliefs to make predictions etc, so our holding them is justified by their accuracy. Religious beliefs/articles of faith are held to devellop character and enrich a person's experience of the world. Therefore their justification and/or criticism will be based on what affect they have on the believer/believers. Again, I'm not arguing for it being metaphorical either. You're right that such a metaphorical interpretation doesn't fit either. Instead of trying to reduce religious belief to metaphor or scientific belief I'm claiming that it's a practice of it's own. Very similar to scientific belief in a lot of ways but with one defining difference - how a person is to apply it in everyday life. Anyone who spends time observing modern religion as it really is comes to the same a-rational conclusion. The common criticism against Dawkins is that he treats all religion like fundamentalism and complete misses the point of moderate religion. The reason why I've gone to such lengths is because it's not just theists who can hold irrational pre-conceptions. We all can. I think that this over-simplifying reduction of the concept of 'belief' is an example. It's common for philosophers who are trying to keep their worldview 'rational' to start re-defining the concepts they use in order to fit into their metaphysical theory. I've made the same accusation against Humean Compatibilists and Physical Reductionists who re-define concepts of mind to fit in with their physicalist metaphysics, but in doing so have merely changed the very concept they were trying to explain in the first place. Trying to mold your language to fit a theory takes you away from language as you really use it. Wittgenstein often noticed that his philosophical claims were common sense to the pleb who was in touch with language as they commonly used it and was only controversial to the philosophers who'd lost themselves in some kind of ideology. Anyway, to highlight the argument I'm making: Human language can be quite varied and the word 'belief' need not refer to the single specific human practice that I'm calling 'scientific belief'. And I'm saying that among the variations is 'religious belief' or 'article of faith' that is similar in almost every way with one difference - the person will act on this belief in a different way. This topic is actually a copy of one I originally posted on the RRS. After Hamby's first reply I re-wrote the argument into clear logical steps. I think Hamby got too busy shortly after to give it a fully analysis, but I could repost it on here if you guys fancy a go.
Do you think a belief is rational if reason leads us to believe it is true, or is it simply rational if holding it leads to a desired outcome?
But your definition of fundamentalism--holding literal/factual beliefs--would appear to include virtually all theists! Clearly this isn't your intention. Can you tell me what they are? So really the problem is how you would define fundamentalists. I don't think the 'design argument' can be called a fundamentalist argument. The problem I have with your definition is the consequences of it: it essentially labels every theists a fundamentalist since virtually every theist will hold some literal/factual claims. In order to escape this problem you have to deny this and say they only have metaphorical beliefs. While most will have metaphorical beliefs, the amount of theists whose beliefs are purely metaphorical, I feel, is miniscule compared to how you're presenting it. You also talk about the goal of the believer not being about fact, but in the process you ignore that while the goal itself might not be concerned with fact, the beliefs and theistic framework will be about fact and the theist will often accept them as being factual. You talk about the practical application... can you tell me what is practical application a resurrection or a virgin birth or walking on water is? Also, I don't think you've captured the common usage. I don't think the degree to which a belief is held is enough to warrant the term fundamentalist. It plays a part in the term but more important is the content/doctrine you are believing. Is that doctrine compatible with todays social standards? You can hold such a belief (e.g. god exists), and believe this with great conviction (e.g. like an Archbishop), and not be a fundamentalist. The problem is you don't think religious beliefs conflict with science. That is clearly nonsense. We can all think of clear examples where moderates will express doubt about the direction of science for religious reasons (British MPs, sophisticated Bishops and theologians, etc). Furthermore, mainstream Christian doctrine is riddled with scientific claims: resurrections and miracles are explicitly scientific claims; they're claims about physics, and biology, etc. You seem to be saying that if the theist is not intending to make a scientific claim, or a claim which conflicts with science, then the claim is not science or shouldn't dealt with scientifically. I disagree. While there may not be intent to conflict with science, by the very nature of the subject it will inevitably happen and I think scientifically minded people have every right to point it out.
Here the next bit: But again, theists (including moderates) themselves also make factual claims; they make evidence-based claims, sometimes directly, other times indirectly. While character and spirituality are important, they will often still believe in the historical, factual, literal framework from which they draw these things. I don't disagree with this. Yes, on one level religious belief is about character, spirituality, building a better life, however, I think you're ignoring the framework which drives the belief. Even if their main concern is a better life, that does not mean they don't think the beliefs and claims are true, literally and historically. In fact, many theists may not even believe in them if it wasn't for their belief in their factual truth. He doesn't "miss the point of moderate religion", he simply focuses on the truth of the claim. For example, either Jesus had a father or he didn't. The Christian either believes he did or he didn't. It's quite simple. Even if the goal is not about whether it is true (although with the resurrection truth is at the centre of it), whether the claim is true is still a valid inquiry. He doesn't treat all religion like fundamentalism, he does argue against mainstream religion (for instance: indoctrinating children, faith schools, etc). I think the problem again comes round to your definition of fundamentalism. You said it your self earlier that you would consider a fundamentalist anyone who takes a recourse to the Bible, or the design argument. Which is quite ironic given the fact you've had to do some semantic gymnastics in order to allow for your conclusion.
Dude, you couldn't have asked a more perfect question! It depends on what you mean by 'belief'. Before I go on, let's think why we need beliefs to be accurate. After all, we rate beliefs as rational/irrational for a reason. It's not just some fetish we have as rationalists. There is a practical justification as to why we treat beliefs the way we do. We use beliefs to solve problems. When constructing a bridge, our beliefs in the laws of physics must be accurate in order for that bridge to hold. When looking for my camera, the accuracy of my belief on where my camera is will determine the search. In each case, the belief in question has a practical usage where we need it to be accurate. So our evaluation of rational/irrational reflects our need for such beliefs to be accurate. If our beliefs weren't applied in a way that requires accuracy, we would evaluate them a different way, one that reflected the purpose. E.g. with jokes we rate them on humour and entertainment value because their purpose is to amuse Now I claim that an 'article of faith' is different to 'belief' in one way - the way that it is applied to real life, an application that doesn't require accuracy in the same way that our applications of 'belief' does. Seeing as our reason for evaluating beliefs as rational/irrational are down to their application, a 'human practice' with a different application would therefore be subject to a different evaluation, one that reflected this purpose. So if people hold 'faith' in order to enhance their experience of the world and improve their moral character, such 'articles of faith' would be justified or criticised on this account. So articles of faith would be a-rational, and evaluated in terms that reflected the effect of these beliefs on the person's character. In order for this to work, people who held 'faith' would need to make sure that they didn't try to apply it like they did their 'beliefs'. My experience of moderates show that they manage this separation nicely. Where they don't, it tends to be a characteristic of the person themselves rather than caused by the religion. i.e. the religion was the subject rather than the cause of their irrational thinking, and it could just as easily been about something not related to religion. (e.g. some kind of conspiracy theory)
Can we save that for another topic? We have enough on the plate as it is. When you have accepted that my 'different practice' theory is a coherent and worthy rival to the 'delusion theory' then it will be the right time to compare them, sticking out the pro's and con's in either. I explicitly denied that I was reducing faith to metaphor. I have said that scientific belief is one thing, fiction and metaphor is another, and 'articles of faith' is a thing in itself that shares a lot more in common with belief than it does with the other two. The only difference I have claimed between faith and belief is how it is applied. This means that articles of faith can still be literal. It's just that they are not to be applied as if they were a normal belief. I think that this sums up moderates nicely, who will declare certain literal facts, but make 'excuses' as to not acting on them as they would if they were scientific facts. They are part of a theology that will have a psychological effect on the person as a whole. The virgin birth perhaps had a significance in a certain culture and the idea of miracles and that "nothing is impossible God" can inspire hope. Perhaps you might still argue that faith is bad for a person's psychology. Maybe so. My only claim in this topic is that is where the criticisms should be aimed at rather than the lack of scientific justification. Yes. Moderates are sometimes susceptible to fundamentalist thinking. Sometimes they dabble in it, just to see where such explorations lead. Sometimes they try to see if they can reach out to sceptics and rationalists who demand such arguments from them. Sometimes they too confuse the difference between 'faith' and 'belief' and feel the need to justify their faith the same way they would a normal belief. My claim that moderates depend more on character is based on, in my experience, which issues they find more important/convincing when it comes to faith. When they dabble in scientific/historical reasoning, a debate that pushes them back into a God of gaps reveals that they were merely dabbling in it. The argument wasn't motivating their belief. Moderates are more likely to see their faith tested by the effect that it has on their life, disillusionment with the religious people around them or being sick of the effect that such beliefs have had on their mind. The more scientific reasoning is academic in comparison. Maybe. This draws on the more complex points on the argument that I'd rather save until we've atleast settled the more basic preliminaries. Like I've said before, I see 'delusion theory' as a real possibility for why people have religion, but even if it's true, as rationalists we have to do this properly and make sure we have thoroughly debunked the alternatives! See my post to LJoll on the difference between 'belief' and 'faith' for an argument as to why in doing this he is missing the point in religion. No irony at all. These 'gymnastics' are down to earth investigations into how we actually use language, rather than trying to squeeze language into abstract rules dictated by a pre-determined ideology. You're not going to catch me out on this one!
I wouldn't call it the delusion theory. I agree with Hambydammit at RRS. Moderate religion and fundamentalist religion are degrees of the the same thing. The only difference is whether the content of the belief conforms to todays social standards. You're trying to portray them as different kinds. This matter is basically the law of excluded middle: They either hold their belief to be literal/historical, or they don't. If the latter, then they either reject the truth of the beliefs or hold them to be metaphorical. Which is it. I think you're getting so wrapped up in potential purpose/use of the beliefs that your ignoring the manner in which they are held. Just because someone holds their religious beliefs for reasons such as living a good life, inspiration, etc, does not in any way mean they cannot hold the beliefs to be literal/historical. Furthermore, I would content that all theists hold their beliefs for such reasons (living a good life, morality, etc). Fundamentalists just feel that in order to live a good moral life you have to turn to the original form of the religion. The moderates on the other hand recognize that somethings are incompatible to current moral/social standards and rejected stuff accordingly. This isn't different kinds of religion, its different degrees of the same thing. Can you concisely define what a 'normal belief' is and what a 'religious belief' is and how they are different. I'll also define what how I am using the term: Belief = Believing a given proposition is true. True = A proposition that corresponds with reality. Thus belief is believing a proposition corresponds to reality. I think you're depending too much on the function of the beliefs when I don't think it changes the nature of the belief itself. You either believe a given proposition corresponds to reality, the objective world, or you do not. The function the belief can vary, but the nature of the belief (whether it is held to be true or false) still remains, for every case. Again, what I am talking about is not the function of the belief, but rather how the theist views the belief: do they consider it to be truth, or not. This follows the law of excluded middle. One of the other must be true. Your only response to this is that moderates sometime take a recourse into fundamentalism (due to your definition of the term). But since it is clearly the case that most, of not all, theists can and do hold literal beliefs, this means that under your definition of fundamentalism, all theists would be fundamentalist. So the problem is 1) your definition of fundamentalism and 2) your notion that moderates do not hold literal/historical beliefs (and that when they do they're merely dabbling in fundamentalism). This is why I am stressing the issue of how the view the status of the belief rather than the function of the belief. Please don't gloss over this. That is scientific reasoning. They see a negative result, they question their belief/claim. This is reasoning, critical thinking and science in practice! Of course, I would deny that most theists are this good. They will usually always come up with a justification/excuse to explain the negative result/bad experience away. It usually take a serious matter or even a succession of them to shake their belief.
i think religius beliefs are a little more involved and intertwined than that. Not singular but too plural, to be reduced to which is it: this or that? Often a religious persons belief will rest on a blend of the literal, the metaphorical and borrow as much strands of scientific credibility as possible. So questions like which is it? as above are pointless. I disagree with this.. Whilst people may share a label in religion, it is far from the same as them practicing the same religion. If one is practicing different things you can say it is really 'degrees of the same thing'. Many religions share similarities yet we differentiate them - why not say they all are 'different degrees of the same thing'. I mean perhaps on one level they are, but you would be covering a very narrow scope with that. how different is for example a fundamentalist Christian to a Fundementalist Muslim. On some level the same on others different. it all may seem quite arbitary then. also you said yourself what you think religion is - some kind of 'personal projection' - the way you describe it is quite agreeable really. Anyway back to a point.. Fundamentalist and moderates, if we seperate people into two such groups i think are ( depending what you want to say) describable both in terms of ' practicing different degrees of the same thing' and 'different kinds of religion'. both descriptions fit, can be said to be true.. And no you can't ask which is it? But anyway as far as the discussion was going i would veer to the point of view that moderates and fundamentalist are essentiall practicing different things - these things being religion in this case. certainly a different kind of religious practice and behaviour - enough to warrant a valid distinction for the purposes of this discussion. i mean when it comes to religion it's not like different interpreations of the same faith don't lead to multitudes of different demoninations. Degrees of the same thing - yea sure. but I think that highlights that in the end, as i tried to allude to a bit earlier 'different religions' and 'degrees of the same' could be interchangable and don't really mark or signify any real distinction between the two terms of description. Does that even make any sense - sorry for the long windedness! [/QUOTE] fwiw - i think a 'religious belief' - or 'article of faith' as strafio puts it is something that we don't know or cant know is true or false. i think what strafio is saying (I could be wrong) is that we have reason to believe things. Such as his chair example or that gravity will propel me to the ground very fast if i jump of a tall building - there are certain things i believe for x reasons. These reasons are what strafio has described as practical purposes - we have a practical reason for holding them - wheras 'articles of faith' do not have such practical purposes. I take this to mean that we can do without them when push comes to shove. a bit like a luxury if you will. They may improve or enhance certain qulaities of life but aren't a necessity, like knowing not to step in front of a bus. Maybe i'll leave the conciseness to Strafio eh..
I've dubbed it delusion theory for want of a better phrase. If you fancy changing it's name, go for it. False dichotomy mon amis! Can you prove that literal/historical and metaphorical are the only two options? Until you do so, your law of excluded middle argument fails. If the burden of proof is on me to provide a third alternative, well what do you think I've spent this entire topic trying to do? Firstly, I do not deny that an 'article of faith' is literal/historical. Just that it's purpose/function is different to normal belief so it's evaluation is different also. I agree too. The difference that fundamentalists conflate 'faith' with 'normal belief'. Well, fundamentalism is conflating 'faith' with normal belief and a fundamentalist is what we call someone who does this a lot. If this is such a perversion of the word 'fundamentalism' then I promise to start thinking of a new word to replace it. Until then, let me use fundamentalism like this. It won't detract from the issue at hand. Fundamentalists just feel that in order to live a good moral life you have to turn to the original form of the religion. The moderates on the other hand recognize that somethings are incompatible to current moral/social standards and rejected stuff accordingly. This isn't different kinds of religion, its different degrees of the same thing.[/QUOTE] Yes. I am familiar with this position. Repeating it won't bring the argument forward. I don't think you need to bring it up in this topic until you've accepted my counter theory as a coherent alternative and we are ready to compare the two. I've already said so. It's how the person makes use of this belief when they apply it practically. The thing is, the nature of belief is defined by it's function. Just like all other concepts. This is how the philosophy of language works. My position is that you have hidden linguistic assumptions that are leading to false conclusions. The purpose of this debate is to investigate them and bring them out into the open. Okay. I hold that they believe it to be true, but the 'thinking whether it is true' isn't what has justified the evaluation of 'rational/irrational'. And 'thinking it is true' means something slightly different for 'belief' and 'faith', a difference I have described by the difference in application. You're the one trying to gloss over the function of the belief, when the function is the vital part of the concept that determines the very meaning of the status.
Of course, your right. There is more to religious belief, however my point is still correct: a) a proposition is either true or false, and b) you either believe said proposition is true or false. They are all doing the same thing. The difference is in the content. They are all accepting claims and holding beliefs based on faith, dogma, little or not evidence - to different degrees Of course, there is a distinction between moderates and fundamentalists, but any distinction is not in kind, which is what Strafio is arguing, but rather in its degree, such as behaviour, factual/literal/metophorical basis, function, etc. It is a spectrum. Well its true that we may cannot know whether many claim are true or false, but we can certainly determine whether the individual believes they are true or false. What other option is there? Proposition: Jesus rose from the dead/a miracle happened/Jesus doesn't have a father/etc. a) I believe the proposition is true b) I believe the proposition is false What other option is there? The function of the belief is a different matter, not a third alternative. The function is not mutually exclusive with the truth-status of the belief (although it would be if it became the third option). Well can you briefly restate both normal and religious belief for my purpose. I want to be clear on this. Thanks. In any case, I contend that there is a difference between how they make use of the belief (i.e. its function in their life), and their position in the truth status of it (i.e. do they believe it is true or false). Give me an example. I think you have it backwards. I think the function of the belief is driven by truth status of the belief. No one will determine whether a claim is true by its function, since its function depends on whether it is true! A belief is applied according to how it is believe. They first assess the truth of the belief and it is the implication of it being true or false which define the function. For example: If the proposition "Jesus rose from the dead" is held to be truth, then it's primary function is defined by the implications of the proposition being true, namely, saving people. If the proposition is held to be false, then the primary function will be metaphorical, and use for inspiration, etc. (Of course, inspiration, morality, etc, will be drawn from it regardless of the truth status, but the primary function depends on how it is believed). It is precisely for this reason why I focus on perceived truth status of the beliefs.
This one also had to be split into two. See the original post. The 'other option' was the entire point of this topic. To give a positive account of what this 'third option' would be. It's all there in the original post. The point you're missing is what it means for the proposition to be held true depends on what the person means by believe. i.e. in what way will this belief affect their actions It will be this that determines what kind of evaluation/justification is appropiate. Yes, but what it means for the belief to be true will depend upon the function of belief. "Everyone has their own truth" is a common phrase among moderates when it comes to religion. They don't share the same attitude towards scientific beliefs. Truth means a slightly different thing in the religious context to the belief context. Because these aren't concepts defined in terms of other concepts, the only way to 'define' them is to give you examples of their use. (btw, there's more in the original post as well as earlier replies) Examples of 'normal belief' A belief that my hand will burn if I put it in fire. This belief will prevent me from putting my hand in. If I believed the glove I was wearing would protect me then that would make putting my hand in a practical possibility. In each case the belief doesn't have a moral value. There's no question of 'good' or 'evil' or 'nice' or 'nasty'. Either correct, which means my actions will go as my belief predicted, or mistaken which means that something else happened instead. Examples of 'articles of faith' There is a God who watches out for you and for this God anything is possible. Jesus performed such actions as walking on water, raising people from the dead and turning water into wine. If these were treated as normal beliefs then believers would act on them. If you had a powerful friend looking out for you then you would be able to count on their protection. If things were possible such as walking on water then people would be tempted to think the trick could be found out or would believe that others could do it too. Moderates don't tend to. They might use phrases such as "Don't test the lord" or "God works in mysterious ways, not the way that you expect him to" but they don't see these as scientific ammendments to the 'miracle theory' but as ways of saying "You're missing the point of faith and religion" They also place a moral value on believing, feeling that it's important for their character and can sometimes be suspicious of the morality of a person who disagrees. They like to use phrases like "You've rejected him", treating it more like a moral choice than a factual correctness. The defining difference between them I see that beliefs and articles of faith can be thought the same way and expressed the same way. "This is true!!" The big difference is how a believer applies the belief. Normal belief has purely applications based on it's predictive power. Consequently it is justified by its accuracy. Articles of faith are more about the believers outlook on the world. They feel more like they are 'sharing' rather than educating. Their primary arguments tend to be how faith has changed their life around and what a difference Jesus (or whatever their belief is) makes in their life. The more fact-based arguments tend to be attempts to appease sceptics and those who aren't interested in their personal experience. They will always claim that it's first and foremost about faith and 'experiencing' God firsthand. They sometimes throw out scientific/metaphysical arguments but are happy to shrug and say "It's a matter of faith" when such arguments are broken down. Accusations of moral value tend to be taken a lot more seriously.
